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STATE ACTION IN SELF-HELP AUTOMOBILE
REPOSSESSION
INTRODUCTION
Americans enjoy many benefits of modern society that they
would not be able to afford without readily available installment
buying plans. A necessary concomitant to a credit purchase of
any size is the taking of some security by the creditor. In the
case of automobile financing the automobile purchased becomes
security for the loan and thus subject to repossession.
This comment considers the constitutional problems inher-
ent in self-help automobile repossession as codified in the Cali-
fornia Commercial Code.' Two recent federal court decisions
provide the primary basis for this discussion, Adams v. Southern
California First National Bank2 and its companion case, Hampton
v. Bank of California.'
AUTOMOBILE REPOSSESSION
A brief consideration of the precise nature of this creditor
remedy and its common law origins provides background for this
comment. Repossession of an automobile for default on the
payment schedule has been a common practice in the United States
1. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (West 1963) reads:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right
to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured
party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without
breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agree-
ment so provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble
the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to
be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to
both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment
unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under
Section 9504.
CAL. COMM. CODE § 9504 (West 1963) reads in part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dis-
pose of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following
any commercially reasonable preparation or processing ...
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured
party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency ...
2. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484
(9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973). The official citation to Adams and Hampton became
available after this comment went to press. The citation after modification of
the opinion upon denial of en banc consideration of rehearing is 492 F.2d 324
(9th Cir. 1973).
3. Hampton v. Bank of California, Civil No. 72,1888 (9th Cir. Oct. 4,
1973). Hampton was consolidated with Adams on appeal, so hereinafter cita-
tions will be solely to Adams unless otherwise indicated.
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for many years. The general remedy of self-help repossession'
has been recognized as part of the common law.' The Uniform
Commercial Code specifically allows this remedy, as did the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act. 6 Some states such as California did
not enact the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. In these states the
validity of self-help repossession depended, until the enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code, on case law and contracts
between the parties to the secured transaction.7  The general rule
was that the buyer's default enabled the seller to repossess under
the terms of the contact or, in the alternative, to do so under an
implied right to self-help repossession.8
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in Cali-
fornia codified the creditor's common law right to self-help repos-
session. Article 9 of the Code deals with secured transactions.
Section 9501 states that when a debtor is in default under a secu-
rity agreement, the secured party has the rights and remedies pro-
vided in Article 9 and, subject to some limitations, any additional
rights and remedies in the security agreement.9  Specifically,
section 9503 provides that unless otherwise agreed a secured
party's right to possession of the collateral accrues on default,
and possession may be taken without judicial process if this can
be accomplished without breach of the peace."0 Section 9504
gives the secured party the right to dispose of the collateral at a
commercially reasonable public or private sale."
Despite the codification of the right to self-help repossession
upon buyer's default, automobile sellers and lending institutions
generally include a specific provision in their security agreements
whereby the buyer agrees that the secured party may either accel-
4. Self-help repossession is a simple remedy whereby the creditor decides
to retake the property involved and dispatches someone to accomplish that task.
The assistance of the judicial process is not required for the actual physical tak-
ing.
5. 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1, at
1212 (1965).
6. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 16.
7. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
6 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
8. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kaeser, 196 Cal. 686, 694-95 (1925) (contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendant contained a clause allowing the seller to repossess
upon buyer's default); Miller v. Steen, 34 Cal. 138, 144 (1867) (defendant-seller
was within his rights under the terms of the contract to retake certain machinery
from plaintiff when plaintiff fell behind in his payments).
9. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9501 (West 1963) reads in part: (1) When a
debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the rights
and remedies provided in this Part and except as limited by subsection (3) those
provided in the security agreement. ...
10. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (West 1963).
11. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9504 (West 1963).
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erate payments upon default or pursue his remedies under the
Uniform Commercial Code or both.'2
Repossession procedures follow a fairly standard practice.
If the debtor does not freely return the automobile to the bank or
loan company involved, a repossessor 13 locates the automobile or
automobiles in question and has them towed away. Because
no notice need be given prior to the taking of his property, the
completely legal element of surprise helps the repossessor avoid
any potentially dangerous arguments with the debtor.
A comparison of the way in which courts have dealt with
other creditors' remedies is helpful in order to analyze auto re-
possession cases. Such a comparison must begin with a discus-
sion of the landmark case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Cor-
poration.'4
SNIADACH AND ITS PROGENY
The prejudgment rights of debtors and creditors have been
12. Creditors continue to maintain their contractual remedy as well as their
statutory remedy, as evidenced by the language in the security agreement in
Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at 3-4 (9th
Cir. Oct. 4, 1973):
Should Debtor fail to make payment of any part of the principal
or interest, as provided in said promissory note . . . the whole principal
sum unpaid upon said promissory note with interest accrued thereon,
• . . shall immediately become due and payable at the option of the
Secured Party. Upon the occurrence of any such event of default Se-
cured Party shall have all of the rights and remedies of a Secured
Party under the California Uniform Commercial Code, or any
other applicable law, and all rights and remedies shall, to the extent
permitted by law, be cumulative. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, upon the occurrence of any such event of default the Secured
Party is entitled to take possession of the vehicle and to take such other
measures as Secured Party may deem necessary for the protection of
the vehicles....
13. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7520 (West 1964) sets forth the basic li-
censing requirement for repossessions. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7521 (West
Supp. 1973) reads in part:
(e) A repossessor within the meaning of this chapter is a person
who, for any consideration whatsoever, engages in business or accepts
employment to locate or recover personal property, including but not
limited to personal property registered under the provisions of the Vehi-
cle Code, which has been sold under a conditional sales agreement or
which is subject to a chattel mortgage. A licensee under this chapter
shall not engage in business or accept employment to collect claims
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another unless the licen-
see has complied with the provisions of this chapter, except that a re-
possessor licensed under this chapter may make a written demand for
payment in lieu of repossession if the demand is made pursuant to an
assignment for repossession and if under the terms of the assignment
the fee or remuneration due to the repossessor is not based on a per-
centage of the amount collected.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7526.4 (West 1963) reads:
An applicant for a license as a repossessor, or his manager, shall
have had at least one year of experience in recovering personal property
sold under a conditional sales agreement or under the terms of a chattel
mortgage or the equivalent thereof as determined by this chapter.
14. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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the subject of extensive litigation in recent years. In 1969, the
United States Supreme Court ruled in Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corporation5 that Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment
procedure violated fundamental principles of due process because
the wage earner had no notice or opportunity to be heard prior
to the garnishment of her wages. 1" Many cases have been liti-
gated since Sniadach in an attempt to determine the exact param-
eters of the decision.17 Some courts narrowly read Sniadach
as holding that notice and a prior hearing are only required prior
to the deprivation of such "necessary" items as wages and welfare
benefits.' However, the United States Supreme Court in a plur-
ality opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin'0 stated that the fourteenth
amendment procedural due process safeguards of notice and prior
hearing attach whenever any significant property interest is at
stake." The court held that the only exceptions would be certain
narrowly defined "extraordinary situations" that justify postpon-
ing notice and opportunity for a hearing.2' The Florida and
Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes were declared uncon-
stitutional because they allowed summary seizure of the debtors'
possessions when only the private gain of individuals was at stake
-a non-extraordinary situation.22
In Blair v. Pitchess,21 the California Supreme Court held
that California's claim and delivery procedures permitting pre-judgment replevin prior to notice or hearing did not meet the pro-
cedural due process requirements laid down in Sniadach.24  The
California high court had previously ruled in McCallop v. Car-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 342.
17. Sniadach and the other cases discussed in this section involved the con-
stitutionality of creditors' remedies which directly involve a state agent in the
taking of the property. Therefore, the requisite state action for a federal cause
of action under the fourteenth amendment was clearly present. See text
accompanying notes 32-35, infra.
Even though the state action question was not in dispute in these cases, they
are discussed because the various creditor remedies involved were condemned for
their failure to provide notice and opportunity for a hearing, the same attacks
made by the plaintiff-creditors Adams and Hampton.
18. See, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (Georgia's statutory garnishment scheme held invalid only as applied to
wages); Black Watch Farms v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971) (court
held as a matter of law that Sniadach not intended to cover real estate attach-
ment procedures); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) (Sniadach
inapplicable to foreclosure of real estate).
19. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
20. id. at 86.
21. Id. at 90.
22. id. at 92.
23. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
24. Id. at 277, 486 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56,
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berry25 and Cline v. Credit Bureau of Sa.ta Clara Valley"8 that
California's wage garnishment procedures were likewise unconsti-
tutional in light of the Sniadach principles.
In Randone v. Appellate Department of Superior Court,27
the state supreme court was asked to consider the constitutional-
ity of California's prejudgment attachment procedures. The
Randones' checking account was attached by a collection agency
without any prior notice or hearing as to the validity of its claim.
The supreme court reversed the refusal of the lower court to dis-
solve the attachment, holding that the attachment statute was
unconstitutional on its face for failing to provide the necessary
procedural due process safeguards of notice and hearing.", The
statute, as written, sanctioned attachment as a proper remedy in
any contract situation and permitted attachment of any and all
property of the debtor other than his wages.29 In Randone, the
California Supreme Court also stated the broad proposition later
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes v. She-
vin ° that the constitutional principles of notice and hearing un-
derlying Sniadach are applicable to any situation where an indi-
vidual is deprived of a significant property interest.
3 1
In all of these cases, some property interest of the debtor
was taken without any notice prior to the taking and without a
preliminary hearing to determine the validity of the claim before
the taking actually occurred. The failure to provide these two
protections was viewed, absent extraordinary circumstances, as a
violation of procedural due process.
By twists of legal history, remedies such as attachments and
replevin have developed involving state officials in their actual
physical enforcement.12  Other remedies such as self-help repos-
session have developed to allow physical enforcement by the
25. 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970). The supreme
court upheld the trial court's determination that prejudgment garnishment of
plaintiff's wages was an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of proce-
dural due process.
26. 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970). The plaintiff
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a threat to garnish his wages to
satisfy a debt. The supreme court, citing McCallop, reversed the dismissal of
the complaint by the trial court.
27. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 924 (1972).
28. Id. at 563, 488 P.2d at 32, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
29. Id. at 561, 488 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
30. 407 U.S. 68, 86 (1972).
31. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547-52, 488
P.2d 13, 20-23, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 716-19 (1971).
32. Writs of attachment or replevin must be obtained prior to the taking of




creditor himself.3" Although all of these remedies suffer from
the same failure to provide notice and opportunity for a hear-
ing, the courts appear disposed to using the state action issue as
a means of avoiding the constitutional problems implicit in self-
help repossession. Analysis of Adams v. Southern California
First National Bank3" and Hampton v. Bank of California,35 re-
cent auto repossession cases, will show how discussion of these
procedural due process problems was avoided.
RECENT AUTO REPOSSESSION CASES
Adams v. Southern California First National Bank8" and
Hampton v. Bank of California7 were companion cases on ap-
peal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. George Adams
borrowed $1000 to pay medical bills. In order to repay the loan
he executed a promissory note for over $1100 and a security
agreement giving the Bank of La Jolla (predecessor in interest to
Southern California First National Bank) a security interest in
three automobiles. The security agreement contained a clause
giving the bank the right to accelerate payments upon default
and to make complete use of all remedies under the California
Commercial Code, including self-help repossession. Adams
had paid nearly $900 of the $1100 'before he defaulted. The
Southern California First National Bank employed Richard Egley,
a licensed repossessor, to take two of the three vehicles from
Adams' possession. The two cars were sold and the resulting pro-
ceeds left a deficit of less than one dollar which was cancelled.
The District Court for the Southern District of California
granted Adams' motion for partial summary judgment, declaring
that enactment in California of sections 9503 and 9504 of the Cali-
fornia Commercial Code amounted to sufficient state action to
raise a federal question under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. as
Based upon that conclusion, the district court decided that the
repossession of Adams' vehicles under authority of sections 9503
33. The creditor makes the decision to repossess and accomplishes the task
without any necessary writs. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
The' California Supreme Court in the recent case of Adams v. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1974), held that
the state's involvement in the imposition and enforcement of garageman's liens
constitutes state action despite the fact that the lien is enforced by the creditor
alone without the aid of state personnel. Id. at 153, - P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr.
at -.
34. Civil No. 72-1484 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
35. Civil No. 72-1888 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
36. Civil No. 72-1484 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
37. Civil No. 72-1888 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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and 9504 was an invasion of the plaintiff's constitutional rights."
The plaintiff in Hampton v. Bank of California0 purchased
a 1967 Buick which was financed by a sales contract assigned
to the bank. After nearly two years of making payments on the
thirty month payment schedule, Hampton was allegedly late in
making one payment and the bank repossessed the car. The
district court dismissed Hampton's complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.4'
These divergent cases from the northern and southern dis-
tricts were consolidated oA appeal. The issue on appeal was
whether prejudgment self-help repossession, as provided for by
security agreements between debtors and creditors and as au-
thorized by sections 9503 and 9504 of the California Commercial
Code, involves sufficient state action to establish a federal cause
of action. Adams and Hampton claimed federal jurisdiction pur-
suant to United States Code, title 42, section 1983 and title 28,
section 1343(3), alleging that California's summary reposses-
sion practices constitute action taken "under color of state law"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.42
Both parties alleged that California authorizes, regulates,
and participates in self-help repossession by means of a pervasive
statutory scheme which sets forth the basic right to summary re-
possession,4" the procedures to be followed during and after re-
possession,4 4 licensing requirements for persons in the business of
repossession, 45 and various other procedures. Adams and Hamp-
ton maintained that these statutes sanction self-help repossession
and thereby significantly involve the state of California itself in
the repossession process.
The court of appeals rejected these arguments unequivo-
cally.46  The court held that the State of California is not so signif-
39. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
2 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
40. Civil No. 72-1888 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
41. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
3 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
43. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (West 1963).
44. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2983.2 (West 1954). This statute provides the cred-
itor the right to sell the repossessed vehicle and details specific requirements for
notifying all persons liable under the conditional sales agreement involved. The
statute is important not for its particular requirements, but because its existence
goes favorably to the question of state involvement in auto repossession. See
also CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 5600-02 (West 1971). These statutes detail the proce-
dure for clearing title to the repossessed vehicle.
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7520 (West 1964); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 7521 (West Supp. 1973).
46. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
7 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
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icantly involved in self-help repossession 'by creditors to permit
the court to find this action to be taken under color of state law.
ANALYZING ADAMS AND HAMPTON
Applicability of Reitman v. Mulkey
The plaintiffs, Adams and Hampton, contended that the
United States Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey45 established
a sufficient basis for finding the necessary color of state law in an
auto repossession situation. 49  However, the Adams-Hampton
court took a position diametrically opposed to that of -the plaintiff-
debtors and held that Reitman was inapplicable to the facts of the
cases before them. 50
The Adams-Hampton majority is undoubtedly correct in
stating that state involvement in private discrimination must be
significant before a federal cause of action arises."' Judge Byrne,
in his dissenting opinion in Adams and Hampton, noted that
the "color of state. law" issue is very conceptual and susceptible
of different interpretations.5 2  The possibility of such differing
interpretations is exemplified by the court's discussion of the ap-
plicability of Reitman to the facts of Adams and Hampton.
The debtors contended that the enactment of sections 9503
and 9504 of the California Commercial Code, the regulation of
motor vehicles sales contracts by the Rees-Levering Act," the re-
47. Id.
48. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
49. Civil No. 72-1484 at 12.
50. Id. at 12-13.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 23-24.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-84.4 (West Supp. 1974). In Adams v. South-
em California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973), re-
hearing denied, Civil No. 72-1484, at 4-5 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973) (Hufstedler,
J., dissenting from denial of en banc consideration of rehearing), Judge Hufsted-
ler presents a very convincing argument that the heavy regulation of the automo-
bile-secured credit industry by the Rees-Levering Act coupled with codified self-
help repossession as an ingredient of that industry compels the conclusion of
state action in Adams and Hampton. She enumerates all the statutes relating
to self-help repossession and the licensing of repossessors and then concludes
with the following statement:
California is not a neutral bystander in a contest between these
private debtors and creditors. The economy of the state has become
heavily dependent on the automobile industry in all its parts, an essen-
tial feature of which is consumer credit secured by interests in auto-
mobiles. California's statutory authorization to creditors to seize auto-
mobiles without prior notice or hearing reduces the creditor's costs of
repossession, for the evident purpose of stimulating the flow of con-
sumer credit for the benefit of the state's economy, at the expense of
those whose automobiles are summarily seized. Thus, the automobile-
secured credit industry in California has become a state instrumentality
through which California seeks to generate public benefits.. Of greater
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quirement that all repossessors be licensed, 54 and the clearing
of title to repossessed vehicles for creditors5" together amount to
significant state authorization and encouragement56 of self-help
remedies. Adams and Hampton relied principally on the case of
Reitman v. Mulkey 57 to demonstrate that the presence of such a
statutory scheme amounts to significant state action for constitu-
tional purposes.
The court of appeals, however, based its rejection of this ar-
gument on Reitman, contending that the rationale of that case
could not be extended to a case involving debtors' and creditors'
rights.5" The two features said to distinguish Reitman from
Adams and Hampton are: 1) the effect of the conduct challenged
in each case on pre-existing law; and 2) the fact that Reitman
involved racial discrimination.
These two factors, however, do not necessarily make the
state action definition of Reitman inapplicable to Adams-Hamp-
ton. The first claimed distinction, that the State was "much more
significantly involved" in Reitman because the challenged con-
duct was an attempt to reverse pre-existing law,59 is an assertion
of dubious importance. The only fact justifying such an assertion
is that the passage of Proposition 14 reversed pre-existing law,6"
while the enactment of the California Commercial Code codified
pre-existing law.6' The Adams-Hampton court failed to ex-
moment in this state action context, however, is that California's reg-
ulatory scheme, by delegating to private persons power to resort to self-
help, saves the state the expense that it would otherwise incur in using
its own governmental personnel to seize the property and in providing
notice and hearing before the state's judicial and quasi-judicial officers.
The state cannot avoid the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment by
thriftily abdicating these functions to private persons. It cannot do so
by expressly delegating a part of them to creditors or their nominees.
54. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7520 (West 1964); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 7521 (West Supp. 1974).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2983.2 (West 1954); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 5600-02
(West 1971).
56. CAL. VEH. CODE § 28 (West 1971) requiring that the police be notified
of self-help repossessions is another statute the plaintiffs could have cited in this
context.
57. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The California Supreme Court held that article
1, section 26 would have created a constitutional right to discriminate on ra-
cial grounds in the sale and leasing of real property. The United States Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that the challenged amendment significantly en-
couraged private discrimination and through its enactment involved the state in
this discrimination. Id. at 381.
58. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
12-13 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
59. Id.
60. The California legislature had previously enacted several statutes regulat-
ing racial discrimination which were, in effect, a nullity after the passage of Prop-
osition 14.
61. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
13 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973). The passage of Proposition 14 changed pre-existing
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plain why conduct which reverses pre-existing law involves
more significant state action than conduct which codifies pre-
existing law.
The Adams-Hampton court overlooked a statement relevant
to this supposed distinction in Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio,
Inc.,62 a case cited by the court in another context to support its
rejection of the plaintiffs' case.63 The Palmer court stated that
the United States Supreme Court in Reitman held that state action
is present in the enforcement of any statute or amendment which
authorizes or encourages violations of constitutional rights regard-
less of whether the act codifies the common law, creates new law
or otherwise alters the common law. 64
In Reitman, the passage of Proposition 14 would have added
a new amendment to the state constitution; the repeal of such an
amendment must be accomplished by another statewide referen-
dum. A statute such as section 9503 of the Commercial Code
can be repealed merely by a vote of the legislature. The state
conduct in Reitman might be denominated more "serious" but
the seriousness of the act does not go to its significance in terms
of the quantum of state action necessary to amount to conduct
taken "under color of state law."
The second factor which the Adams-Hampton court indicated
made the Reitman concept of state action inapplicable to the re-
possession issue is the fact that Reitman involved racial discrimi-
nation.65 In Reitman, the United States Supreme Court agreed with
the finding of the California Supreme Court that the challenged
referendum was passed by the voters with the intent to perpetuate
racial discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment."'
The court of appeals implied that the rationale in Reitman re-
quires evidence that the State intended -to authorize conduct violat-
ing the fourteenth amendment by enacting the relevant sections of
the California Commercial Code.67 Such a subjective intent would
be extremely difficult to prove, but even if it were provable, the
establishment of a specific intent is not necessary to show a viola-
law while the enactment of sections 9503 and 9504 of the California Commer-
cial Code made no changes in pre-existing law.
62. 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
63. See text accompanying notes 79 to 88 infra.
64. In Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 163 (6th Cir.
1973), the court cited Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967) as support-
ing this interpretation of the Reitman holding. The cited section of Reitman
reasonably lends itself to this interpretation.
65. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
13 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
66. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967).
67. Civil No. 72-1484, at 13 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
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tion of fourteenth amendment due process rights.68
The court of appeals relied heavily on the United States Su-
preme Court interpretation of what the California Supreme Court
did not hold in Reitman. The Adams-Hampton court quoted the
United States Supreme Court's statement in Reitman that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court did not hold that a state may never codify
an existing policy of neutrality with respect to private discrimina-
tions.69 The Adams-Hampton court implied that the enactment
of sections 9503 and 9504 was merely the codification of such an
existing policy of neutrality.70
The weakness in drawing implications from such dictum is
demonstrated by a closer examination of whether the Commer-
cial Code provisions perpetuated an existing policy of neutrality.
Prior to its enactment, creditors were forced to rely on their con-
tractual rights to self-help repossession or on case law granting
them such a right. The enactment by the State of statutes codify-
ing these policies did not keep it neutral in dealings between debt-
ors and creditors because creditors then had an additional means
provided by the State of enforcing their contracts. The court of
appeals claimed that the State could not be held responsible for
the standardized contracts which usually provide for self-help re-
possession in the event of default. 71  However, the State can be
held responsible for providing statutes which make the enforce-
ment of such contracts all the easier.
"Requiring" Action versus "Encouraging" Action
The court rejected the debtors' charge that all the statutes in-
volved create an extensive system of state regulation amounting
to state action.72  The court cited Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis a
as authority for this rejection on the grounds that in Adams and
Hampton, as in Moose Lodge, the regulations have no signifi-
cance on the issue for decision.74 The court implied that the is-
sue in Adams-Hampton is whether there is a pervasive state
scheme to require the use of self-help repossession.7" If the is-
68. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
69. Civil No. 72-1484, at 14 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 15-16.
73. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In Moose Lodge, the Supreme Court held that
Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme enforced by the state liquor board did not suf-
ficiently implicate the state in the Lodge's discriminatory guest policies to make
these practices "state action" within the purview of the Equal Protection clause.
74. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at 16




sue is phrased in those terms the answer is, of course, that the
regulations do not require creditors to use the remedy of self-help
repossession. However, the question is whether state law must
require a certain action before that action can be said to be car-
ried out "under color of state law." The state constitutional
amendment under attack in Reitman did not require that citi-
zens discriminate on the basis of race in renting or selling their
homes; on the contrary, the amendment left that decision entirely
up to the landlord or homeowner. It was enough "color of
state law" for such a landlord to be encouraged to discriminate
on the basis of race because of the existence of the amendment. 76
The Adams-Hampton court implied that the California stat-
utes regulating auto repossession must require the use of that rem-
edy before sufficient state action can be found to reach the consti-
tutionality of the procedure. 77  The court stated that self-help re-
possession is one of several alternatives open to the creditor.78
It is misleading to assume that other creditor remedies leave the
creditor with no alternatives; in all cases the decision to invoke
any creditors' remedy is made by the creditor. The distinction
is that the assistance of the judicial process is required to complete
most remedies, whereas repossession is carried out by private indi-
viduals. The property involved is retaken because the debtor is
behind in his payments to a particular creditor. Therefore, the
failure to maintain payments is the original reason for the retaking
of property in all cases, and the decision to retake the property is
always made by the creditor. The only difference is the means of
enforcement. The state may require a particular method of en-
forcement in certain cases but, in all cases, the creditor has the
same initial latitude in deciding whether the property should be
taken.
Applicability of Utility Service Termination Cases
The Adams-Hampton court decided that only non-racial
cases discussing the "color of state law" issue were relevant to the
auto repossession problem.79 On that basis, the court found cases
involving utility service termination procedures to be relevant in
disposing of the issue at bar.80  However, the court failed to ex-
76. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967). The two factors which
the court of appeals said distinguished Reitman from Adams-Hampton do not
really involve the question of "encouraging" conduct versus "requiring" conduct.
See text accompanying notes 48-71 supra.
77. Civil No. 72-1484, at 16 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id.
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-plain why utility service termination cases are any more relevant
than any other type of case. The finding of state action in these
utility service cases is said to be warranted 'by significant affirma-
tive state support contributing to the effectiveness of the defend-
ant companies' conduct.81 Such significant affirmative support
occurs in utility service termination cases because the state con-
trols nearly every aspect of the operation of public utilities.8 2
However, the choice of this line of cases as a test for the quantum
of state involvement necessary to constitute state action is ques-
tionable. The very nature of public utility operations is such that
the state has been deeply involved in the operation of these facili-
ties.83  The majority in Adams-Hampton cautioned that if all
conduct which conforms to state law is state action for the pur-
poses of the fourteenth amendment, then the state action concept
is emasculated. 4 The state action concept can be likewise emas-
culated by requiring any conduct said to be "under color of
state law" to involve the state to the extent that it is involved in
public utility operations.
The Adams-Hampton court became internally inconsistent
in its rationale when it stated that utility service termination cases
are relevant to the state action discussion in Adams-Hampton be-
cause of their non-racial nature, and then proceeded to rely specifi-
cally on Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc."5 The inconsist-
ency arises because the Palmer court supported its finding of
state action in that case 6 with an extensive discussion of Reitman
v. Mulkey,"7 a case which the Adams-Hampton court labeled in-
applicable to non-racial cases.88
Applicability of Hall v. Garson and Fuentes v. Shevin
The plaintiffs, Adams and Hampton, argued that the act of
repossession, although private in form, is a function that would
otherwise be performed by the state.89 Their principal reliance
was on the Fifth Circuit case of Hall v. Garson,9 ° in which the
court held that a landlord who enforced his statutory landlord's
81. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1973); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison, 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
82. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1973).
83. Id. at 163-64.
84. Civil No. 72-1484, at 9-10 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973). See also Jojola v.
Wells Fargo Bank, Civil No. C-71 900 SAW (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1973).
85. 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
86. id. at 163.
87. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
88. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
89. Civil No. 72-1484, at 17 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
90. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
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lien by entering the dwelling of his tenant and seizing her televi-
sion set was performing an act which had all the characteristics of
state action.9 The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Hall on
the grounds that the tenant actually owned the television and
that enforcement of such a statute had historically been the func-
tion of the State of Texas." The court made no attempt to sup-
port this latter "distinguishing" factor and in addition asserted
without any support that an argument "can" be made that repos-
session is traditionally a private function and, hence, no state
delegation of power is involved.9"
The claim that Hall v. Garson is inapplicable because the
tenant owned the television set loses much of its validity upon
closer examination of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Fuentes v. Shevin.9 4  In Fuentes, the plaintiff purchased goods
under a conditional sales contract.9 5  The Supreme Court was not
concerned that the debtors had not entirely paid for the property
involved; rather, the Court found it unconstitutional that the debt-
ors were deprived of their use interest in the property without
fulfillment of required procedural due process. 6 The attempt of
the Adams-Hampton court to distinguish Hall from the facts at
bar, on the grounds of ownership versus non-ownership, appears
inapposite in light of the Fuentes extension of due process rights
to the protection of any significant property interest regardless of
who holds legal title.
Deficiency Judgments and State Action
The debtors Adams and Hampton alleged that the deficiency
judgment action allowed by California Commercial Code section
9504 following the sale of a repossessed vehicle results in judicial
enforcement of procedures in which due process has been de-
nied,9 7 thus coming under the protection of Shelley v. Kramer9"
91. Id. at 439.
92. Id. The Hall court stated that the execution of a lien, Whether a tra-
ditional security interest or a writ of attachment or judgment lien has tradition-
ally been the function of the sheriff in Texas. Apparently the Adams-Hampton
court relied on this statement to distinguish Hall from Adams-Hampton.
93. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484, at
19 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
94. 407 U.S. 68 (1972).
95. Mrs. Fuentes had purchased a stove and a stereo under a conditional
sales contract calling for monthly payments over a period of time. Id. at 70.
96. Id. at 86.
97. Civil No. 72-1484, at 20 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
98. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Shelley court held that private agreements to
exclude persons of a designated race from the use or occupancy of real estate
for residential purposes does not violate the fourteenth amendment, but that it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment for the
courts to enforce these restrictive covenants.
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and Barrows v. Jackson.99
However, the court of appeals found two major differences
between the enforcement of a deficiency judgment and the en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenants. The court stated that
the deficiency claim is based on the underlying debt and, thus,
arguably not related to the alleged unconstitutional seizure.1"'
However, if the deficiency judgment becomes necessary because
the repossessed auto has been sold to an associate of the reposses-
sor at a price below fair market value, then the need for the de-
ficiency judgment is arguably related to the self-help seizure of
the car. This relation exists because establishment of the valid-
ity of the claim under judicial auspices, with proper protection of
the procedural due process rights of the debtor, would protect the
debtor's interest to a greater extent.
The Adams-Hampton court also rejected the attempt to
come under the protection of Shelly and Barrows with the tenuous
statement that restrictive covenant cases "may be" and "appar-
ently" have been limited to situations where judicial enforcement
had the effect of forcing an unwilling party to discriminate.'
Although it may be apparent to the Adams-Hampton court that
Shelley and Barrows have been limited to such situations, the
court failed to cite any authority in support of that statement.
Summary of the Court's Opinion in Adams and Hampton
In finding for the creditors in these companion cases, the
court of appeals decided that the concept of state action should
not be expanded to invoke federal protection over security agree-
ments between debtors and creditors. 102 The single most im-
portant factor in the failure to find state action in Adams and
Hampton was the court of appeals' finding that Reitman v. Mul-
key does not apply to cases which do not involve racial discrimi-
nation. That finding is obviously open to disagreement, as evi-
denced by the court's boot-strap analysis of why Reitman does
not apply to debtor-creditor cases"'0 and by the large number of
courts which have applied Reitman to non-racial cases.' 0 4  The
99. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The Barrows court held that the enforcement of
a covenant forbidding use and occupancy of real estate by non-Caucasians, by
an action at law in a state court to recover damages from a co-covenantor for
a breach of the covenant, is barred by the fourteenth amendment.
100. Civil No. 72-1484, at 20 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 22.
103. See text accompanying notes 48-71 supra.
104. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1973); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Holt v. Brown,




court of appeals' rejection of Reitman is also open to question
when this same court utilizes Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,10
primarily a racial discrimination case, to support its rejection of
the plaintiff-debtor's arguments.
Utilization of the state action issue to avoid the merits of a
constitutional challenge is an example of so-called judicial restraint.
The Adams-Hampton court avoided consideration of the alleged
procedural due process deficiencies of current self-help reposses-
sion procedures by deciding that the plaintiff had not shown the
requisite state action constitutionally necessary before such con-
siderations can be invoked. An earlier section of this comment
discussed the due process problems involved in the creditors' rem-
edies invalidated in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation'0 6
and its progeny. This comment will conclude with a brief dis-
cussion of the similar due process problems in auto repossession
and the propriety of using the state action issue to avoid passing
on the constitutionality of these procedures.
CONCLUSION
The practice of self-help repossession deserves a more ade-
quate judicial exploration than that given it in Adams-Hampton.
A state statutory scheme which codifies a remedy and regulates
its enforcement in various ways should not be dismissed as insig-
nificant solely because the remedy existed in some form prior to
the adoption of the statutes. °7 The debtor-creditor relation-
ship has never been based on equal bargaining power, but the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach was the be-
ginning of a move to more fully protect the rights of debtors-
usually persons in an inferior bargaining position. It remains to
be seen whether the question of significant state involvement in
the enforcement of creditor remedies such as self-help reposses-
sion will impede further clarification of debtors rights.' An ap-
propriate response to using the state action issue to avoid further
development of debtors' rights is the comment of Chief Judge
Chambers, who during oral argument in Adams before the dis-
trict court leaned over the bench and asked counsel, "Isn't there a
message in Fuentes?"'0 8
The "message" in Fuentes is that debtors can not be de-
prived of any significant property interest without notice and the
105. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
106. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See text accompanying notes 15-35 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
108. Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A
Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 116,
150 n.148 (1973).
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opportunity for a prior hearing to determine the validity of the
creditor's claim. 109 The Supreme Court in Fuentes found the fail-
ure to provide these protections a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 110 Chief Judge Chambers
seems to be referring to the apparent incongruity of refusing to
consider whether another creditor remedy such as self-help re-
possession also violates the fourteenth amendment. The Consti-
tution mandates certain protections for debtors in their relation-
ships with creditors."' The obvious question, apparently an-
swered in the affirmative by the Adams-Hampton court, is
whether the state action issue can be used to avoid protecting
debtors from violation of their procedural due process rights.
If the debtor-purchaser of an automobile falls one payment
'behind schedule, the lending institution or other creditor can send
a repossessor to take the car. The debtor need not be told that
the car is to be taken, nor does he have an opportunity to protest
the validity of the taking at a hearing prior to the actual repos-
session. If the debtor does not meet the creditor's payment de-
mands, the car will be sold. If the proceeds of the sale are not
sufficient, the debtor is liable for a deficiency judgment." 2
These auto repossession practices appear to suffer from the
same constitutional infirmities-lack of notice and opportunity
for hearing-which have been condemned in a long line of cases
previously discussed.113  The fact that automobiles are involved
raises another question which is beyond the scope of this com-
ment-does automobile repossession involve deprivation of a ne-
cessity of life.114  Some people would argue that an automobile is
not a necessity of life," 5 but the courts and the California legisla-
109. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 68, 86 (1972).
110. Id. In the recent case of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4671
(U.S. May 13, 1974), the United States Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana
sequestration statute similar to the replevin statutes invalidated in Fuentes. The
statute in Mitchell was distinguished on two grounds: one, it provides an oppor-
tunity for an immediate hearing to determine whether the writ of sequestration
should be maintained or dissolved, and, two, the writ is initially issued by a judge
rather than by a clerk as in Fuentes. The Court felt that these two factors pro-
vide the due process protection which was missing in the procedures invalidated
in Fuentes.
111. See text accompanying notes 15-3 5 supra.
112. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9504 (West 1963).
113. See text accompanying notes 15-35 supra.
114. A number of cases, notably Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Super.
Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), have discussed the
deprivation of necessities of life. The court stated in Randone that the hardship
imposed by the attachment of a debtor's "necessities of life" is so severe that
a creditor's private interest is probably never sufficient to permit the imposition
of such deprivation before notice and hearing on the validity of the creditor's
claim. Id. at 558, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
115. See Ratzlaff v. Portillo, 14 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 92 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1971).
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ture have in the past treated an automobile as important enough
to merit greater protection from a taking than that given to other
consumer goods."' The emphasis in California on building free-
ways instead of developing mass transit and the presence of the
so-called urban sprawl are further reasons why the automobile
is more easily called a necessity in California than in other states.
The Adams-Hampton court expressed the concern that if
all conduct conforming to state law is state action for purposes
of the fourteenth amendment, then the state action concept is in
danger of emasculation." 7  The court implied that finding suffi-
cient state action in the facts of Adams and Hampton would make
it possible for state action to be found in any conduct which
conforms to state law, thus flooding federal courts with a multi-
tude of new actions." s
The fear that the state action concept would be emasculated
must be countered with the possibility that failure to find state ac-
tion in this case will emasculate the procedural due process rights
of debtors. The procedures used in self-help auto repossession
appear unconstitutional in light of the lack of notice and opportunity
for prior hearing. Debtors definitely have the right to notice and
prior hearing, but it is conceivable that these rights may be cur-
tailed if the courts use the state action issue to avoid deciding
whether these rights have been violated in any particular case.
Courts are constantly "drawing lines" and the court of ap-
peals in Adams and Hampton found a line it refused to cross in
protecting the rights of debtors. Finding state action in the re-
possession of an automobile would not make it necessary to find
state action in any conduct which conforms to state law. Auto
repossession can be distinguished from other types of conduct
which are subject to little or no state regulation and thus much
less easily said to be carried out under color of state law." 9 Use
116. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 561, 488
P.2d 13, 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 726 (1971). The court cited several cases dis-
cussing the deprivation of necessities and then stated:
Whereas several of the foregoing cases primarily involved the de-
privation of only one kind of necessity, such as "household furnishings,"
the broad attachment statute before the court today combines the vices
of nearly all of the invalidated procedures, since it permits the attach-
ment of any and all property of a debtor other than wages. Thus, un-
der section 537, subdivision 1, checking and savings accounts, home
furnishings, tools of the debtor's trade, automobiles, accounts receiv-
able, and even the debtor's residence . . are initially subject to attach-
ment without notice and hearing. (Footnotes omitted).
But see CAL. Cr. PRO. CODE § 690.2 (West Supp. 1974) which allows a debtor
to exempt from execution one automobile with a total value of not over $1,000
if his equity over and above all liens and encumbrances does not exceed $500.
117. Civil No. 72-1484, at 9-10 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973).
118. Id.
119. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
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of the courts' analytical powers may be employed to effectively
narrow the state action concept without denying the due process
rights of debtors in automobile transactions.1 20
The courts should redraw the line in an auto repossession
situation because of the closeness of the state action issue, the
heavy regulation by the state of activities associated with use and
possession of automobiles, 2 ' and the strong public policy in favor
of improving debtors' positions in relation to creditors. This
redrawing should be accomplished by holding that state involve-
ment in self-help auto repossession is at least sufficient to find a
federal cause of action. Such a step would then require the court
to reach a decision on the merits of the constitutional challenges
to self-help auto repossession. Until such a redrawing is accom-
plished, the evolution of debtors' rights which began with Snia-
dach may have ground to a halt.
Neil M. Schwartz
120. See Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484
(9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973), rehearing denied, Civil No. 72-1484, at 6 (9th Cir.
March 12, 1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting from denial of en banc considera-
tion of rehearing). Judge Hufstedler stated:
Underlying the reluctance of this court to reach the state action
destination to which the Supreme Court has directed us is fear that the
same path will carry the Fourteenth Amendment into boundless terri-
tory. I do not share that fear. . . . Even in those restricted instances
in which private activity is drawn into the public orbit, few private acts
are of the kind that could be found substantively violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment. When the alleged violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment lies in the procedural due process realm, flexible accom-
modations of the competing interests involved can be fashioned.
121. See note 53 supra, and text accompanying notes 53-56 supra. In addi-
tion to the heavy regulation of automobile credit and self-help repossession, the
State heavily regulates use and possession of automobiles by means of the Ve-
hicle Code. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 4000 (West 1971). The argument can be
made that enterprises operating within heavily regulated areas of activity are per-
forming functions substantially affecting the public. Where an activity such as
automobile repossession not only falls within a regulated area (general regulation
of automobiles), but is also the subject of a specific statute which expressly au-
thorizes that activity, then private conduct pursuant to that statute is state action.
CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (West 1963). Judge Hufstedler makes this argument
drawing on the principles of Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)
and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Adams v. Southern
California First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-1484 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1973), rehearing
denied, Civil No. 72-1484, at 3-4 (9th Cir. March 12, 1974) (Hufstedler, J., dis-
senting from denial of en banc consideration of reheating).
